Tuesday, March 26, 2013

SANDF - Beaten by ‘Bandits’

Seleka rebels from the Central African Republic (Sia Kambou, AFP) - Sourced from mg.co.za

It has been confirmed that 13 South African soldiers were killed in Bangui, Central African Republic (C.A.R.)  Twenty seven were wounded, and one soldier is still not accounted for. This news was confirmed in a statement by President Zuma on the eve of the hosting of the 5th BRICS Summit.

I have my doubts though whether the ANC government is being completely truthful about this utter embarrassing catastrophe. While nobody seems to really know whose interests the SANDF were protecting in the C.A.R., I have a strong feeling that the Masters of Darkness have, for a long time now, been playing all four sides of the chessboard in this protracted and ongoing game of theirs, in the hope that democracy will be achieved sometime in the future with another puppet-government - (check out this video to discover the true hidden meaning of democracy).

The master chess players must also have known that Zuma is an absolute idiot. Why else would he send troops into a warzone miles away from home? What National purpose does it achieve? Did he really believe that untrained and inexperienced SANDF troops were going to withstand an onslaught by war-toughened rebels, or “bandits” as he calls them?

“About 200 of our men fought a force of more than 1 000 bandits for nine hours," Zuma told journalists in Pretoria on Monday.

We will probably never know whether this is true, or not, but his explanation for the SANDF defeat sounds just like that explanation a guy once gave his mates after he was beaten-up by a girl… “You should have seen those guys; all ten of them were armed to the teeth. I fought like a tiger!”

All jokes aside…
The so-called Séléka rebels who overthrew the government on 24 March, 2013, and who purportedly outgunned and outwitted SANDF soldiers in Bangui are not a small gang of armed ‘bandits’, but a hefty coalition force. When the latest rebel offensive started in December 2012 it did not take them long to overrun and seize numerous towns in the C.A.R., capturing and killing numerous government soldiers and large quantities of weapons in the process. Don’t tell me Zuma was unaware of this offensive and the approaching attack on Bangui, where the SANDF troops were based. Or was he really that naive to think that the French were going to save their butts?

The Séléka rebels coalition force
  • Democratic Front of the Central African People (FDPC)
  • Convention of Patriots for Justice and Peace (CPJP)
  • Union of Democratic Forces for Unity (UFDR)
  • The Alliance for Revival and Rebuilding (A2R)
  • The Patriotic Convention for Saving the Country (CPSK)
Towards the end of 2012 all these groups launched a major joint offensive under the new Séléka banner. (Source)

The following details provide ample proof that the rebels were actually gaining the upper hand since December 2012 already:

December 2012 rebel offensive
On 10 December an armed group seized the towns of N'Délé, Sam Ouandja and Ouadda. Rebels fought with government and allied CPJP troops for over an hour before securing the town of N'Délé. At least five government troops were reportedly killed. At Sam Ouandja, rebels claimed to had captured 22 soldiers and heavy mounted weapons.

On 15 December, rebel forces took Bamingui, a town approximately 120 km (75 mi) from N'Délé in a direct line towards Bangui. Three days later they advanced to Bria, an important diamond mining town lying 200 km (120 mi) southeast of Ouadda. The successful early morning rebel assault on 18 December killed over 15 government soldiers. The Seleka claim they are fighting because of a lack of progress after a peace deal ended the 2004–2007 Central African Republic Bush War. Following an appeal for help from Central African President François Bozizé, the President of Chad, Idriss Déby, pledged to send 2,000 troops to help quell the rebellion. The first Chadian troops arrived on 18 December to reinforce the CAR contingent in Kaga Bandoro, in preparation for a counter-attack on N'Délé.

Seleka forces took Kabo on 19 December, a major hub for transport between Chad and CAR, located west and north of the areas previously taken by the rebels. Four days later the rebel coalition took over Bambari, the country's third largest town, followed by Kaga-Bandoro on 25 December. On the same day, President Bozizé met with military advisers in the capital Bangui.

On 26 December hundreds of protesters angered by the rebel advance surrounded the French embassy in Bangui, hurling stones, burning tires and tearing down the French flag. The demonstrators accused the former colonial power of failing to help the army fight off rebel forces. At least 50 people, including women and children, were sheltering inside the building, protected by a large contingent of around 250 French troops that surrounded the area. A separate, smaller group of protesters chanted slogans outside the US Embassy and threw stones at cars carrying white passengers, according to news reports. A scheduled Air France weekly flight from Paris to Bangui had to turn back "due to the situation in Bangui", a spokeswoman at the company said.

Later in the day rebel forces reached Damara, bypassing the town of Sibut where around 150 Chadian troops are stationed together with CAR troops that withdrew from Kaga-Bandoro. Josué Binoua, the CAR's minister for territorial administration, requested that France intervene in case the rebels, now only 75 km (47 mi) away, manage to reach the capital Bangui. Colonel Djouma Narkoyo, a spokesman for Seleka, called on the army to lay down its weapons, adding that "Bozizé has lost all his legitimacy and does not control the country." – (Source)

I cannot agree more with the following opening and concluding remarks made by foreign editor, Peter Fabricius:
Opening remark:
“South Africa’s mysterious military mission into the Central African Republic seems to be blowing up in our faces, quite literally.”

Concluding remark:

“It’s hard to avoid concluding that this has been an ill-conceived mission.”
IOL News

Another worthwhile read on this subject is a recent article compiled by Eeben Barlow:

Failing to listen
By Eeben Barlow - 25 March 2013

As has become quite usual and an almost daily occurrence, rebel forces throughout central Africa have gained momentum and succeeded in defeating government forces. Often, the government forces appear to be very well trained in running away whilst the rebel forces appear to be better trained, have more cohesion, are better armed and even have better mobility than the government forces.

I am also amazed at how easily - and quickly - governments dismiss intelligence in favour of disinformation. Could it be that they believe the “advice” given them by foreign governments or so-called “subject matter experts” is more credible than that given by people who do actually have “ears on the ground”?

The escalation of tensions in the so-called Great Lakes region is a fine example of governments’ failure to listen. It appears they are advised to adopt the ostrich approach (sticking their heads in the sand and hoping the problem will simply go away) – an approach that is apparently becoming the norm. This approach apparently assures governments that the problem will indeed “go away” if it is simply ignored.

Often these rumours are clustered around other rumours that give credibility to the false sense of security that an interested party is trying to develop. Selected “leaks” to the media result in these rumour-clusters being given more credibility – and this is then fed back to the government as fact “as the media said so”.  

The end-result is that when they finally pull their heads out of the sand, the problem has become a crisis. Those who so generously misadvised at great financial cost have by then long flown the coup. The crisis rapidly escalates into a blood-letting of aggrieved citizens and ill-disciplined troops and the entire system of government collapses.

The culture of failing to listen is partly the result of being fed so much rubbish that it becomes literally impossible for governments to distinguish fact from fiction… Continue reading on Eeben Barlow's Milsec Blog.


EEBEN BARLOW saw active service in conventional, clandestine and covert units of the old South African Defence Force. He was the founder of the Private Military Company (PMC) Executive Outcomes in 1989 and its chairman until he left in 1997. Until its closure in 1998, Executive Outcomes operated primarily in Africa helping African governments that had been abandoned by the West and were facing threats from insurgencies, terrorism and organised crime. Executive Outcomes also operated in South America and the Far East.


See also the following book, available free online and published by the Institute for Security Studies:

Peace, Profit or Plunder? : The Privatisation of Security in War-Torn African Societies

Bear in mind that in 2006 the ANC government enacted legislation prohibiting South Africans from engaging in mercenary activity and to regulate the provision of security services in countries of armed conflict. Its real aim was to prohibit (mainly white) South Africans (ex-military) from engaging in mercenary activity. Thousands of white South Africans, who could not find employment in their home country and who were involved in security work in Iraq and other countries suffered as a result of this stupid ANC law.

I'm sure they now regret ever passing that bill!

Executive Outcomes Against All Odds

FOUR BALL, ONE TRACER: Commanding Executive Outcomes in Angola and Sierra Leone

Bloodsong!: An Account of Executive Outcomes in Angola


always-a-realist said... .....Click here to refresh this blog

Barlow is a cointelpro agent working for the Zio military industrial complex who are chiefly responsible for the destabilization of Africa in order to rob it of its minerals.

Tia Mysoa said... .....Click here to refresh this blog

@always-a-realist - Can you provide any proof that Eeben Barlow was involved?

COINTELPRO was a covert project conducted by the FBI and took place between 1956 and 1971. They were exposed in the year 1971. Executive Outcomes was apparently established in 1989.


Nik said... .....Click here to refresh this blog

To call the battle a defeat seems a little strange to me. 200 of our troops faced over 3000 hostile personel (some estimates range up to 7000). Fourteen KIA/MIA, as sad as it is, seems pretty light given the circumstances.
Say whatever you want about the politics of the situation, but to brand the battle as a defeat is just straight up wrong, in that it is inaccurate, and in that it is incredibly disrespectful to not only the soldiers who survived the battle, but also to those who paid the ultimate sacrifice.
SANDF faced a force somewhere between fifteen and thirty five times greater than their own, and yet it was the CAR rebels who after taking a heavy beating, not only called for a cease fire, but also apologised for picking a fight in the first place! But somehow, you have the audacity and lack of responsibility to try to mislead us into believing that the SANDF was defeated! You need to change.

Tia Mysoa said... .....Click here to refresh this blog

@Nik – Why does it seem strange to you to call this battle a defeat?

“Defeat” is the opposite of victory. When applied to warfare it has a direct bearing on the successes achieved in personal combat. I cannot see what successes the SANDF achieved in Bangui. Did the rebel fighters not seize the presidential palace and overrun the entire city? According to the latest media reports the rebels are still in control of Bangui, so – who are the victors here?

Various Military Experts (and not this blog) have described this battle as the worst DEFEAT since the end of apartheid (google is your friend). The ANC government is trying their best to sweep this “defeat” under the carpet, to save their own butts.

The core (and final) objective of the SANDF mission was to immobilize the rebel offensive at Bangui, in an act of self-defence. They had to accomplish the task with limited resources and military intelligence because the useless ANC government misjudged the whole situation from the start.

I agree – the SANDF soldiers fought bravely, but let’s not lose sight of the fact that this is what they do for a living. The bottom line is this: 13 unnecessary deaths occurred because the ANC government have, since coming to power in 1994, destabilized and weakened the SANDF.

In the light of the above I thus take exception to your comment – particularly your accusations pertaining to “lack of responsibility” and this blog misleading people.

See also two related articles on this blog - posted after this one was published:

Battle of Bangui: Zuma has blood on his hands! (March 27, 2013)

'The Battle in Bangui: The untold inside story' – Truth or Propaganda? (April 14, 2013)

Anonymous said... .....Click here to refresh this blog

in depends on what the sandf was doing there in a millitary defeat i dont u walk out u run away or ur negotiated out u dont blv zuma saying there were more rebels than than the sandf bt u turn around and explain how large seleke is instead of al this u should ask who was involved in screwing us coz the african that was supposed to b the 1st line of defence dissapeared nd if which analyst called it a defeat?they r saying worst number of soldiers dead fix ur facts plz nyc piece thou wrong at it was

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